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Abstract
We construct an ascending auction for heterogeneous objects by
applying a primal-dual algorithm to a linear program that represents
the e±cient-allocation problem for this setting. The auction assigns
personalized prices to bundles, and asks bidders to report their pre-
ferred bundles in each round. A bidder's prices are increased when he
belongs to a \minimally undersupplied" set of bidders. This concept
generalizes the notion of \overdemanded" sets of objects introduced
by Demange et al. (1986) for the one-to-one assignment problem.
Under a submodularity condition, the auction implements the Vick-
rey{Clarke{Groves outcome; we show that this type of condition is
somewhat necessary to do so. When classifying the ascending-auction
literature in terms of their underlying algorithms, our auction ¯lls
a gap in that literature. We relate our results to various ascending
auctions in the literature.
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11 Introduction
Though much of auction theory has developed in the context of sealed-bid
auctions, there are practical arguments (Cramton, 1998) favoring the use of
\ascending" auctions. For example, such dynamic procedures may create
more transparency in the auctioneer's methods, bidders may reveal less pri-
vate information, communication and computation costs may be decreased,
etc. These arguments are supported by the circumstantial evidence that the
second-price (Vickrey) sealed-bid auction is unknown to many laypersons in
that form, while its ascending version|the English auction|is commonly
known.
While it is easy to see that the English auction dynamically implements
the second-price auction of a single object, ascending counterparts may be
less obvious in other environments. Indeed, previous works in the litera-
ture have derived such generalizations for special cases, as we discuss below.
In this paper, we consider the general case in which an auctioneer wishes
to sell a set of heterogeneous, indivisible objects to bidders with possibly
non-additive valuations. We derive what we consider to be the appropriate
generalization of the English auction1 for this model by using a method sug-
gested by Bikhchandani et al. (2002). Speci¯cally, we formulate the e±cient
object-assignment problem as a particular linear program. Afterwards, we
examine an algorithm that is used to solve such linear programs, and show
how it can be interpreted as an ascending auction.
Generalizing the English Auction
There are at least two natural ways in which the English auction can be gen-
eralized to other environments, depending on how one interprets the outcome
of a second-price auction in the single-object case.
In one interpretation, the price paid by the winner can be viewed as a
Walrasian price: when everyone is o®ered the object at this price, every bid-
der can make a purchase decision in a way such that the market \clears."
That is, only one bidder wishes to consume the object.2 Under this interpre-
tation, a generalization of the English auction should terminate in \minimal
Walrasian prices" that support the e±cient assignment of objects.
1It may be more accurate to say that we generalize the Japanese (button) auction.
2More technically, at most one bidder strictly wishes to, and at least one weakly wishes
to. The second-price auction ends at the minimal such price.
2In the second, the price can be interpreted as the amount of surplus the
winning bidder takes away from the other bidders by receiving the object.
This more abstract interpretation leads to the general concept of the Vickrey{
Clarke{Groves (VCG) sealed-bid auction. In more general situations, a VCG
auction makes e±cient allocation decisions and charges bidders the amount
by which they impose a surplus loss on the other bidders. Under this inter-
pretation, a generalization of the English auction should terminate in \VCG
prices" that support the e±cient assignment.
While both generalizations involve e±cient object-assignments, Walrasian
and VCG payments typically di®er in more general settings. In the assign-
ment problem, however, they are equivalent. In this setting (involving hetero-
geneous objects, where bidders consume at most one object), Demange et al.
(1986) construct an ascending auction which results in VCG (equivalently,
minimal Walrasian) payments. In this auction, bidders declare which objects
they prefer at current prices, and prices are increased on \overdemanded"
sets of objects|objects which are outnumbered by the bidders who require
them.
In contrast, even for the specialized setting in which all objects being sold
are identical (i.e. homogeneous), Walrasian prices and VCG payments need
not coincide. Ausubel (2004) has designed an ascending auction which results
in VCG payments for this case. On the other hand, the ascending auction
that produces minimal Walrasian prices for this case (under the assumption
of sincere bidding) is the well known uniform-price auction.
To better understand the di®erences between the VCG and Walrasian
interpretations, it is useful to think of an ascending auction as an algorithm
which optimizes the use of the auctioneer's resources.
A Systematic Approach
In linear programming problems, the dual variable of a constraint represents
the increase in value which could be obtained by relaxing that constraint. A
bidder's pro¯t in a VCG auction is the increase in \value" (of the objects)
that can be attributed to that bidder's presence. Bikhchandani and Ostroy
(2002) relate these two observations by formulating the e±cient-assignment
problem as a linear program whose dual variables yield the bidders' pro¯ts
in a VCG auction (when a certain condition is satis¯ed).
We take this idea one step further by interpreting a primal-dual algorithm|
used to solve such linear programs|as an ascending auction for the heteroge-
3neous object case, when bidders may have non-additive valuation functions.
This \recipe" for designing auctions, brie°y outlined by Bikhchandani et al.
(2002), is as follows.
1. Formulate the e±cient-assignment problem as a linear program. By
doing this appropriately (a lµ a Bikhchandani and Ostroy, 2002) dual
variables can be interpreted as the payments made by bidders and/or
the surplus they receive.
2. Formulate a primal-dual algorithm for this linear program.
3. Interpret the algorithm as an auction.
We perform the ¯rst step in Section 2. The dual of our linear program
provides bidder-speci¯c prices for bundles of objects. In Section 3 we show
how the primal-dual algorithm lends itself to an auction interpretation. In
particular, it asks bidders to list the bundles of objects they demand at
current prices, and then adjusts those prices accordingly. In Section 4 we
discuss situations in which our generalization of the English auction in fact
implements VCG payments.
It is natural to wonder whether this recipe can be used by replacing, in
Step 2, the primal-dual algorithm with some other iterative algorithm used
to solve linear programs. For example, a subgradient algorithm also works
by adjusting dual variables; could it also yield an ascending auction? In
Section 5 we show that a subgradient algorithm for this problem can be
interpreted as the auction described by Ausubel and Milgrom (2002).
More generally, if one examines the special cases that have appeared in
the literature, it appears that many of the well-known ascending auctions
can be derived from either a primal-dual or subgradient algorithm. Table 1
categorizes such auctions, where the underlying algorithm operates on opti-
mization problems whose variables correspond to prices.3
One di®erence between the two algorithms is the information they uti-
lize at each iteration. In auction terms, a primal-dual algorithm requires a
bidder to report his entire demand correspondence at each iteration, while a
3Notable exceptions to this particular classi¯cation are the works of Ausubel (2000) and
Parkes and Ungar (2002). While those works can certainly be related to such algorithms
(e.g. there is explicit use of primal-dual algorithms in the latter paper), they operate with
the use of additional parameters (variables) which, in our view, cannot be interpreted as


















Ausubel and Milgrom (2002)
Table 1: This auction literature can be categorized based on the underly-
ing algorithm.
subgradient algorithm requires the report of only one element of the demand
correspondence. While both algorithms converge to an optimal solution,
only the primal-dual algorithm is guaranteed to do so in a ¯nite number
of iterations. Hence there is a tradeo® in the merits of the two algorithms:
complexity of each iteration versus number of iterations. For instance, since
the auctions of Parkes (1999) and Ausubel and Milgrom (2002) are ¯nite,
they do not necessarily converge to the exact solution (though Parkes and
Ungar (2002) provide upper bounds on this e±ciency loss).
2 The E±cient Allocation Problem
There is a ¯nite set of bidders N, and a ¯nite set of indivisible objects (or
goods), G. Each bidder j 2 N has a non-negative, integer valuation for each
set of objects H µ G denoted vj(H) 2 N0 (with vj(;) = 0). We assume
that v(¢) is non-decreasing, i.e. H µ H0 implies vj(H) · vj(H0). Preferences
are quasi-linear: A bidder j who consumes H µ G and makes a payment of
p 2 R receives a net payo® of vj(H) ¡ p.





jNj: i 6= j implies ¹i \ ¹j = ;
ª
An assignment need not allocate all objects, since we do not require
S
j2N ¹j =
5G. Assignment ¹ 2 ¡ is e±cient if it is one that maximizes
P
vj(¹j). E±-
cient assignments allocate all objects, due to the monotonicity assumption.
The problem of ¯nding an e±cient assignment can be solved in various
ways. In order for a linear (as opposed to integer) program to solve such a
problem, it is necessary for the program to have su±cient strength.4 We use
the following linear programming formulation based on Bikhchandani and
Ostroy (2002). Setting ±¹ = 1 is interpreted as selecting the assignment ¹;
setting yj(S) = 1 is interpreted as assigning bundle S to bidder j. Dual










±¹ = 0 8j 2 N; 8S µ G (pj(S))
X
SµG
yj(S) = 1 8j 2 N (¼j)
X
¹2¡
±¹ = 1 (¼
s)
0 · yj(S) 8S µ G; 8j 2 N
0 · ±¹ 8¹ 2 ¡
(P)
Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002) show that this formulation has an op-
timal integer solution, i.e. it ¯nds an e±cient assignment; this turns out to
be a consequence of Corollary 1 below. While the second set of constraints
is redundant, the corresponding dual variables ¼j can be interpreted as each
bidder j's surplus (net payo®). The dual variable associated with the ¯rst
type of constraint, pj(S), is interpreted as bidder j's price for the set S. The
variable ¼s is interpreted as the seller's surplus.
Observe that the equality constraints could be replaced by inequality
constraints (·) without a®ecting the program's value.5 Since each vj(S) is
non-negative, the ¯rst constraint can be made to hold with equality without
decreasing the objective function. Since vj(;) ´ 0, it would not a®ect the
objective function to add weight to ±¹, where ¹ is the assignment that as-
signs all bidders the empty set; hence the third constraint also can be made
4Linear relaxations of some integer programs may not ¯nd integer feasible outcomes in
some classes of problems; see Bikhchandani et al. (2002).
5We thank the Associate Editor for emphasizing this.
6to hold with equality without cost. Finally, the redundancy of the second
constraint means it, too, can be made to hold with equality in an optimal
solution. Inequality constraints would directly imply non-negativity of the
dual variables. Nevertheless, we have chosen equality constraints in order
to simplify some of the analysis below and to make it more similar to the












pj(¹j) ¸ 0 8¹ 2 ¡ (±¹)
(D)
The choice variables pj(S), ¼j, and ¼s are not sign-restricted. By the
integrality of (P) mentioned above, e±cient assignments of objects can be
supported by (dual) prices that are non-additive and non-anonymous (Sec-
tion 4.3), meaning that di®erent bidders see di®erent prices for the same
bundle.
3 The Primal-Dual Auction
We ¯rst give a brief overview of primal-dual algorithms.6 Consider a feasible
program and its dual of the following form (with each bj ¸ 0). We omit
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aji'j ¸ ci 8i
(d)
If some ' is an optimal solution to (d), then there must exist a primal solu-
tion x that satis¯es the complementary slackness conditions: If
P
aji'j > ci
then xi = 0. Letting I = fi :
P
aji'j > cig, this means the value of the
following \restricted primal" (and its dual) must be zero.
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zj ¸ 0 8j







aji¸j ¸ 0 8i = 2 I
¸j ¸ ¡1 8j (drp)
Since b ¸ 0, (rp) is always feasible (e.g. x = 0 and z = b).
If instead ' is not optimal, then these programs have a negative optimal
value. In that case suppose ¸ is a feasible solution for (drp) that yields





bj'j, yielding an improved value to (d).
Of course to maintain feasibility in (d) requires ¢ to satisfy
P
aji('j +
¢¸j) ¸ ci for any constraint i. By choosing such a ¢ and updating the dual
variables from ' to '+¢¸ we obtain feasible dual variables that are \closer"
to being optimal. The primal-dual algorithm repeats this adjustment until
an optimal dual solution is reached.7
To implement this algorithm, there is some °exibility in choosing each
iteration's direction of adjustment ¸. Note that we did not require ¸ to be
an optimal solution to (drp) in the argument above. Any ¸ that satis¯es P
bj¸j < 0 would improve the dual variables as above. Therefore, we have
some freedom in choosing ¸. In fact, we use a modi¯ed version of (rp)|
omitting some of the zj's|then choose ¸ in a speci¯c way (Theorem 1) to
guarantee a monotonic adjustment of prices through each iteration.
In summary, the algorithm works as follows.
1. Choose a feasible solution to (d).
2. Verify whether it is optimal by identifying a primal solution to (p) that
is complementary to it. This is done by appending the complementary
slackness conditions as constraints to (p), yielding the \restricted pri-
mal" (rp).
3. If the dual solution was not optimal, then the dual (drp) tells you how
7Furthermore, the algorithm can do so in a ¯nite number of steps if, for example, ¢
is always chosen maximally (subject to each
P
aji('j + ¢¸j) ¸ ci). Our proof of the
¯niteness of our implementation (Corollary 1) is even more straightforward.
8to adjust the dual solution to make it \closer" to optimal. Adjust the
dual solution and repeat.
In Section 3.1 we perform these steps on our programs (P) and (D);
subsequently we reinterpret these steps as an auction.
1. Choose low initial prices pj(S), e.g. pj(S) ´ 0.
2. Try to satisfy the bidders by ¯nding an assignment which satis¯es each
bidder's demand at current prices.
3. If no such assignment exists, adjust prices and repeat.
One of our main points is to demonstrate that the construction of an
ascending auction|determining how to adjust prices|can be performed by
examining the primal-dual algorithm for the associated linear program.
3.1 Implementing the Algorithm
The choice variables of (D) are of the form pj(S), ¼j, and ¼s. To simplify
matters, however, we are able to maintain the following equalities throughout
the algorithm while ensuring feasibility.
¼j = max
SµG







pj(;) = 0 8j 2 N
It is simple to check that the ¯rst two conditions are naturally ful¯lled by any
optimal dual solution. To satisfy the third condition, we set each pj(;) = 0
as part of our initial, feasible dual solution, later ensuring that this value
never changes (De¯nition 3).
Therefore, in our implementation of the primal-dual algorithm, we can
refer to the pj(S)'s as the dual variables, since their choice determines the
values of the remaining variables. Furthermore these equalities result in the
economic interpretation of ¼j as bidder j's (potential) surplus at current
prices, and of ¼s as that of the seller.
9De¯ne, respectively, the set of active bidders, the demand correspondence
of any bidder j, and the buyer-compatible part of the supply correspondence
as follows.
N
+ ´ fj 2 N : ¼j > 0g
Dj ´ argmax
SµG
[vj(S) ¡ pj(S)] = fS µ G : ¼j = vj(S) ¡ pj(S)g
¡




pj(¹j); and ¹j 2 Dj [ f;g8j 2 Ng
For simplicity of notation, we suppress the dependence of these concepts
on the pj(S)'s. The set ¡¤ consists of the revenue maximizing allocations
which are compatible with bidders' demand in the sense that a non-empty
bundle is assigned only if it is demanded. Observe that, in general, this set
may be empty. Given arbitrary prices pj(S), the assignment(s) that maximize
seller revenue may allocate non-demanded sets of objects to the bidders. In
our implementation of the algorithm below, however, ¡¤ remains non-empty
due to the way we adjust variables.
The (non-redundant) complementary slackness (CS) conditions are as
follows.
j 2 N









pj(¹j) > 0 =) ±¹ = 0
These conditions have straightforward economic interpretation. Bidders who
currently want something should receive something; non-demanded bundles
should not be allocated; an assignment of objects should maximize seller
revenue.
As described in the beginning of Section 3, our aim is to construct a re-
stricted primal with respect to the constraints of (P) and the complementary
slackness conditions. To that end, if (y;±) are feasible primal variables that
satisfy (CS), then it is straightforward to check that ±¹ = 0 for all ¹ = 2 ¡¤. By
setting to zero and then removing all variables (±¹)¹= 2¡¤ and (yj(S))S= 2Dj, and
appending the CS conditions to (P), we obtain the following restricted pri-
mal, which we interpret below. We deviate slightly from the version of (rp)
10presented earlier in that we add arti¯cial (zj) variables to only some of the
primal constraints. (Upon a ¯rst reading, set K = N+; later we explain our
more general use of this program for K µ N+.)
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0 · yj(S) 8j 2 N; 8S 2 Dj
0 · ±¹ 8¹ 2 ¡
¤
0 · zj 8j 2 N
+
(RP K)
Since we have added arti¯cial variables (zj's) only to some of the primal
constraints instead of to all of the constraints from (P) (thereby deviating
from the standard prescription of the primal-dual method), it is conceivable
that even (RP N+) may be infeasible. We show (Theorem 2), however, that
this never happens in our use of the program.
This program has a straightforward interpretation of which we make use
below. For any K µ N+, (RP K) picks an assignment ¹ 2 ¡¤ to minimize
the number of bidders in K whose demands are left unsatis¯ed; Z(K) is
(the negative of) that number of unsatis¯ed bidders. It is worth noting
that the arti¯cial variables zj (j 2 N+) correspond to the yj(;) variables in
(P). Indeed, ; 2 Dj if and only if j = 2 N+. Furthermore, if zj = 1 then P
S2Dj yj(S) = 0, so ±¹ = 0 whenever ¹j 2 Dj; therefore ¹j = ; whenever
±¹ > 0. It is to clearly highlight these as arti¯cial variables that we do not
write those constraints equivalently as
P
S2Dj[f;g yj(S) = 1.
As in the standard implementation of the primal-dual algorithm, if Z(N+) =
0, then (p;¼) is an optimal dual solution and we are done. Otherwise a
11primal-dual algorithm adjusts the dual variables in accordance with the fol-
lowing dual.










½j(¹j) ¸ 0 8¹ 2 ¡
¤
¸j ¸ ¡1 8j 2 K
¸j ¸ 0 8j 2 N
+ n K
(DRP K)
We interpret ½j(S) as a (direction of) price change for bundle S 2 Dj for
bidder j. As a consequence, we do not change the prices of non-demanded
bundles. We interpret ¸j as the change in bidder j's surplus and ¸s as the
change in the seller's surplus. When the program has a negative value, total
(potential) surplus must decrease.
In order to de¯ne an ascending auction, we search for a solution to
(DRP N+) such that ½j(S) ¸ 0 for all j 2 N and S 2 Dj. Such a solution
may not exist if the variables for (D)|the pj(S)'s|are chosen arbitrarily
(e.g. too high). It does exist, however, under a certain overdemand prop-
erty de¯ned below. That this property continues to hold throughout the
adjustment procedure is what we intend to show.
De¯nition 1 Given the sets N+, Dj, and ¡¤, we say that overdemand
holds if (RP N+) is feasible and Z(N+) < 0.
Feasibility of (RP N+) requires ¡¤ to be nonempty. In turn, this implies
that any unassigned object cannot be allocated in a way that creates addi-
tional revenue for the seller. In this sense, this rules out prices that get \too
high."
The following de¯nition is central to describing the price changes we use.
We consider it to be the natural generalization of the concept of minimal
overdemanded sets of objects introduced by Demange et al. (1986).
De¯nition 2 When overdemand holds, we say that a coalition K µ N+ is
undersupplied if Z(K) < 0. Such a coalition K is minimally undersup-
plied if for all K0 ( K, Z(K0) = 0.
12It is clear that the de¯nition would not change if the phrase \all K0 ( K "
were replaced with \all K0 = K n fjg with j 2 K." Furthermore, if overde-
mand holds then there exists at least one non-empty, minimally undersup-
plied coalition.
Our ¯rst main result is that non-negative price changes can be chosen so
that only minimally undersupplied bidders see positive price increases.
Theorem 1 If overdemand holds then for any minimally undersupplied coali-
tion K µ N+, there is a feasible solution to (DRP N+) that yields negative
value to (DRP N+), and satis¯es ½j(S) = 1 for all j 2 K and S 2 Dj, and
½j(S) = 0 otherwise.
Proof Let K be minimally undersupplied. By minimality, Z(Knj) = 0 for
any j 2 K; that is, the demands of K n j can be satis¯ed by some ¹ 2 ¡¤.
Since K is undersupplied, we have Z(K) = ¡1, i.e. precisely jKj¡1 bidders
in K can be satis¯ed.
We construct an optimal solution to (DRP K) where ½j(S) = 1 for all
j 2 K and S 2 Dj, and ½j(S) = 0 otherwise. Set ¸j = ¡1 for all j 2 K and






¸j = jKj ¡ 1 ¡ jKj = ¡1:
(By duality it is even optimal.) Since any feasible solution to (DRP K) is
feasible for (DRP N+), this completes the proof.
In fact, the conclusion of Theorem 1 also holds for any (possibly non-
minimally) undersupplied K µ N+. We only make use of this result for min-
imally undersupplied sets of bidders in order to implement Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves prices (Section 4).
De¯nition 3 In the proof of Theorem 1, we constructively derived the fol-
lowing price adjustment process.
1. Identify a minimally undersupplied set of bidders, K µ N+.
2. For each j 2 K and S 2 Dj, add ½j(S) = 1 to pj(S); otherwise do not
change pj(S). (This preserves pj(;) = 0 for all j.)
3. For each j 2 K, change ¼j by ¸j = ¡1; for each j = 2 K do not change
¼j.
134. Increase ¼s by ¸s = (jKj ¡ 1).
Based on results below, we can interpret the repeated application of this
price adjustment process as an ascending auction. In practice, steps 3 and 4
are carried out only implicitly in the execution of the auction. The fact that
a bidder's surplus decreases by one (or zero) is a consequence of the price
increases; a similar consequence exists for the seller. The steps are listed here
for completeness in describing the exact primal-dual algorithm.
After such a price adjustment, it is clear that the demand correspondence
for any bidder j = 2 K does not change. For j 2 K µ N+, since valuations
are assumed to be integral, a price increase of ½j(S) = 1 for each S 2
Dj can only enlarge j's demand correspondence; no demanded bundle can
exit the demand correspondence (assuming integrality of prices throughout).8
Therefore, we have the following.
Lemma 1 If prices are integral and overdemand holds, then for every j 2 N
the demand correspondence Dj(¢) weakly increases after a price adjustment.
Conversely, if pj(S) has increased during any price adjustment, S must
be demanded by bidder j at all future iterations. Therefore, if the algorithm
is initialized at zero prices (p ´ 0), then only demanded bundles can have
positive prices.
Another observation is that, after a price adjustment, the seller's demand-
compatible supply correspondence ¡¤ can change in only two ways. First,
some ¹ 2 ¡¤ could no longer be revenue maximizing after a price change. In
this case, since the seller's revenue changes by ¸s = (jKj ¡ 1), the change in
revenue from ¹ must be jfj 2 K : ¹j 2 Djgj · jKj¡2. Second, some ¹ = 2 ¡¤
could become revenue maximizing after a price change. This can happen









where ¹0 is one of the assignments in ¡¤ that satis¯es jKj ¡ 1 of the bidders
in K.
To ¯nally prove that prices increase throughout the algorithm, we have
the following result.
8After the price adjustment, a demanded bundle may yield zero surplus to the bidder,
but this bundle is still (weakly) demanded.
14Theorem 2 Beginning the algorithm at p = 0, overdemand holds after each
iteration of the price adjustment process until termination.
Proof It is clear that initially when each price is set to pj(S) ´ 0 overde-
mand holds: all bidders demand Dj(p) = fGg and ¡¤ is the set of n + 1 as-
signments where one bidder (or the seller) is assigned G and all other bidders
receive nothing. Clearly (RP K) is feasible, N+ = N, and Z(N) < 0.
Furthermore, if prices are integral at the beginning of an iteration, then
they remain integral after the iteration, by our speci¯cation of unit price
increases.
In order to prove the result, it su±ces to prove that feasibility of (RP K)
holds from one iteration to the next; if Z(N+) < 0 after the iteration, then
overdemand holds; otherwise, Z(N+) = 0 and the algorithm terminates with
an optimal solution. Below, the subscript or superscript t denotes the value
of a variable during the tth iteration of the price adjustment.
Assume that (RP Kt) is feasible during iteration t (and that prices are
integral). We show that an optimal solution to (RP Kt) de¯nes a feasible
solution to (RP Kt+1). Let (±t;yt;zt) be such an optimal solution, and with-
out loss of generality suppose it is integral,9 so ±t
^ ¹ = 1 for some ^ ¹. The
assignment ^ ¹ satis¯es the demand of (jKtj ¡ 1) bidders (where Kt is the
minimally undersupplied set in round t). Since (¼s)t+1 = (¼s)t + (jKtj ¡ 1),
that assignment is still revenue maximizing for the seller in round (t + 1).
With Lemma 1, this implies ^ ¹ 2 ¡¤
t+1.
Therefore, a feasible solution to (RP Kt+1) can be obtained from (±t;yt;zt)
by setting ±
t+1
^ ¹ = 1 and all other ±t+1
¹ variables to zero. This implies
y
t+1
j (^ ¹j) = 1 for all j 2 N and y
t+1
j (S) = 0 otherwise. The z
t+1
j variables can
obviously be chosen to complete a feasible solution; for all j 2 N
+
t+1, zj = 1
if and only if ^ ¹j = ;.
Theorems 1 and 2 imply that prices are nondecreasing throughout the
algorithm. Since the primal-dual algorithm eventually solves (P), this de¯nes
an ascending auction that terminates with the e±cient assignment.
De¯nition 4 A Primal-Dual (hereafter, PD) Auction is de¯ned as an
iterative procedure as follows.
1. Initially set t = 1 and prices to zero: pt
j(S) ´ 0 for all j 2 N, S µ G.
9Integrality of (RP K) follows from integrality of (P).
152. With respect to current round-t prices, ask the bidders to reveal their
demand correspondences, Dt
j.
3. If overdemand holds, perform the price adjustment process (De¯ni-
tion 3): choose a minimally undersupplied set of bidders Kt, and set
p
t+1
j (S) = pt
j(S) + 1 for each j 2 K, S 2 Dt
j; all other prices remain
the same p
t+1
j (S) = pt
j(S). Increase t by one and return to Step 2.
4. If overdemand does not hold, choose an assignment ¹ 2 ¡¤
t, and charge
the bidders pt(¹j), ending the auction.
Observe that this de¯nition does not uniquely de¯ne an algorithm, since
(in Step 3) there may be multiple minimally undersupplied sets of bidders
in a given round of the auction.10 In Section 4 we show (Theorem 4) that
under some conditions this choice is inconsequential.
Corollary 1 Every PD Auction weakly increases all prices pj(S) until ter-
mination, yielding an e±cient assignment in a ¯nite number of steps.
This follows from Theorems 1 and 2. Since valuations are ¯nite, there
can only be a ¯nite number of unit price increases.
3.2 An Example
In this section we present an example of a PD Auction applied to a set-
ting with three bidders and three goods. Table 2 lists, for each round of
the auction, the prices each bidder faces for each bundle, and the resulting
surplus each bidder would obtain from each bundle at those prices. A bid-
der's demand correspondence is the set of bundles yielding maximum surplus
(appearing as boldfaced surpluses in the table).
In each round, an undersupplied set of bidders is chosen. To choose
such a set, the auctioneer must determine the set of revenue-maximizing
assignments, ¡¤, which allocate objects in a demand-compatible way. The
maximum revenue obtainable for the seller in each round is the seller's sur-
plus, ¼s, given in the last column of the table. Observe that in rounds one,
10This step is the main one distinguishing our auction from those of Parkes (1999) and
Ausubel and Milgrom (2002). Their subgradient-based auctions prescribe price increases
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































17two, three, and ¯ve, there are multiple minimally undersupplied sets of bid-
ders. For such rounds, the auctioneer must choose one of them, on whom he
implements price increases. In Section 4 we discuss the implications of this
choice.
For these valuation functions there are four e±cient assignments in the
example. One assigns (to Bidders 1, 2, and 3) (c;b;a). The other three are
(c;;;ab), (c;a;b), and (bc;;;a). Observe that each one is revenue maximizing
and demand-compatible in the ¯nal round of the auction. Furthermore, each
of them gives the bidders their Vickrey-Clarke-Groves payo®s (de¯ned in
Section 4).
4 VCG Payments and Substitutability
A well-known mechanism in the literature is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves sealed-
bid auction. It chooses e±cient outcomes based on the reported preferences
of participating agents, and prescribes payments to/from the agents in a way
that induces the agents to report their preferences truthfully. We formalize
this mechanism in our environment with the following de¯nitions.
Let V (N) represent the value of (P), which can be interpreted as the
\social surplus" of the auction setting. More generally, for any subset of
bidders K µ N, let V (K) = max¹2¡
P
K vj(¹j). This amount would be the
social surplus if only the bidders in K were present.
With respect to a given e±cient assignment ¹¤, bidder j's VCG pay-
ment is de¯ned to be V (N nj)¡
P
i2Nnj vi(¹¤
i). His resulting VCG payo®
(or marginal product) is therefore V (N) ¡ V (N n j). Since the bidder's re-
ported valuations cannot a®ect the seller's calculation of V (N n j), he max-
imizes his payo® by reporting a valuation function which maximizes V (N).
This alignment of e±ciency with a bidder's incentives is what makes the
VCG payment scheme appealing.
In (P), the dual variable associated with the constraint
P
SµG yj(S) =
1 can be interpreted as bidder j's VCG payo®: Reducing the right hand
side of this constraint to zero has the e®ect of removing bidder j from the
problem. The resulting change in the optimal objective function value is
V (N) ¡ V (N n j), which is bidder j's marginal product.
This argument shows only that among the set of optimal dual solutions
to (D) there is one that gives bidder j his marginal product. This argu-
ment does not prove that some optimal dual solution yields every bidder's
18marginal product simultaneously. In fact, there may not exist such a dual
solution. Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002) address this question by provid-
ing the following necessary and su±cient condition for such a dual solution
to exist, simultaneously yielding all bidders' VCG payo®s (and hence their
VCG payments).
De¯nition 5 We say that Agents are Substitutes when the marginal
product of any set of bidders M µ N exceeds the sum of the marginal
products of the individual bidders in M, i.e.
V (N) ¡ V (N n M) ¸
X
j2M
[V (N) ¡ V (N n j)] 8M µ N: (ASC)
This condition implies that individual bidders add relatively less to the
social surplus than they do to the surplus of smaller coalitions. In addition,
this condition is necessary and su±cient for the VCG payments (and the
seller's VCG receipts) to be in the core of the cooperative game associated
with this model.11 The VCG payo® scheme is in the core of such a game
when, for any M µ N, the total payo® to the bidders in M plus the seller's
VCG revenue weakly exceeds V (M), i.e. when
X
j2M





[V (N) ¡ V (N n j)]
¸
¸ V (M):
This is equivalent to (ASC).
Theorem 3 (Bikhchandani and Ostroy, 2002) If Agents are Substitu-
tes (ASC), then among all optimal dual solutions (¼j)j2N to (D), the one
that maximizes
P
j2N ¼j yields the bidders' VCG payo®s: for all j 2 N, we
have ¼j = V (N) ¡ V (N n j).
Intuitively, to derive VCG payments with an ascending-price algorithm,
this result leads us to decrease the values of ¼j in a \minimal" way, so as not to
adjust beyond a dual solution which maximizes
P
j2N ¼j. A PD auction does
this by increasing prices only for minimally undersupplied sets of bidders.
11See Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002). In the cooperative game, the set of agents is
N [fsg (where s denotes the seller) and the characteristic function Â is de¯ned so that for
all M µ N, Â(M [ s) = V (M) and Â(M) = 0. A similar observation appears in Ausubel
and Milgrom (2002).
19For this to work, though, requires that this type of substitutability condi-
tion hold also with respect to subsets of bidders. The reason for this is that,
since the early rounds of a PD auction may force a bidder to compete against
only a subset of other bidders (in a minimally undersupplied set), comple-
mentarities within that subset may drive prices too high. Intuitively, if the
\wrong" subset of bidders is chosen to compete within itself, then prices on
some bundles could be driven too high. In that case, VCG payments could
not be reached monotonically.
Therefore, our main result in this section is that under the stronger condi-
tion of the submodularity of coalition values V (¢), a PD auction yields VCG
payments.12
Theorem 4 Suppose that for all M µ M0 µ N and all j 2 N we have
V (M [fjg)¡V (M) ¸ V (M0 [fjg)¡V (M0). Then any PD Auction termi-
nates in VCG payments (regardless of the choice of minimally undersupplied
set in each round).
Proof We show that at termination ¼j = V (N) ¡ V (N n j) for all j 2
N. Since the primal-dual algorithm terminates with optimal dual variables,
it must terminate with ¼j · V (N) ¡ V (N n j) for all j 2 N. This is
because V (N)¡V (N nj) is the e®ect of reducing the right-hand side of the
corresponding primal constraint from one to zero, so ¼j cannot exceed that
value.
Suppose by contradiction that by the monotonicity of the price adjust-
ment process, there exists an iteration of the algorithm, t, such that (i) for all
j 2 N, ¼
t¡1
j ¸ V (N)¡V (Nnj) and (ii) for some l 2 N, ¼t




l + 1 = V (N) ¡ V (N n l).
Since l is part of the minimally undersupplied set selected in period t¡1,
Kt¡1, there exists an assignment ¹ ¹ 2 ¡¤
t¡1 with ¹ ¹l = ; that is optimal for
(RP Kt¡1). Let M = fj 2 N : ¹ ¹j 6= ;g, so Kt¡1 n flg µ M. Let ^ ¹ be an









vj(¹ ¹j) ¡ ¼
t
j
12This submodularity condition is also the one under which Ausubel and Mil-
grom's (2002) auction implements VCG payments. See Section 5.











j + (V (N) ¡ V (N n flg) ¡ ¼
t
l)





j + (V (M [ flg) ¡ V (M))





















Analogous to the proof of Theorem 2, since both ¹ ¹ 2 ¡¤
t¡1 and ¹ ¹ was optimal
to (RP Kt¡1), we know that ¹ ¹ 2 ¡¤
t as well.
Therefore at time t the assignment ^ ¹ has better value to the seller than
the seller optimal assignment ¹ ¹; thereby providing a contradiction.
In the example of Section 3.2 (Table 2) the submodularity condition
of Theorem 4 is satis¯ed, so the auction results in VCG payments. It
is straightforward to observe that for those valuation functions, we have
V (f1;2;3g) = V (f1;3g) = 9, V (f2;3g) = 7, and V (f1;2g) = 8. Therefore,
Bidder 2's VCG payo® is zero; he should either consume nothing, or pay
his full value for whatever bundle he receives. This occurs in any of the
four e±cient assignments in the example. Similarly, the ¯nal surplus of Bid-
ders 1 and 3 equal their VCG payo®s (of V (f1;2;3g) ¡ V (f2;3g) = 2 and
V (f1;2;3g) ¡ V (f1;2g) = 1 respectively).
Without the submodularity condition in Theorem 4, a PD auction need
not terminate in VCG payments.13 It is of interest to note, however, that
even in such cases, a single (predetermined) bidder's VCG payment can be
obtained by choosing, whenever possible, an undersupplied set excluding that
bidder.
13Such an example is available upon request. The example shows that the Agents are
Substitutes condition is not su±cient to guarantee that VCG payments result from any
PD auction, depending on the choice of undersupplied sets of bidders.
21Theorem 5 Fix bidder j, and suppose that in each round, a PD Auction
chooses a minimally undersupplied set of bidders K so that, whenever possi-
ble, j = 2 K. Then prices at termination give bidder j his VCG payo®.
Proof We show that by making such choices of minimally undersupplied
sets, we have ¼j = V (N) ¡ V (N n j) at termination. Fixing j as in the
Theorem, let iteration t be the last one at which ¼t
j = V (N)¡V (N nj). The
existence of t follows from the integrality of the price changes and valuations,
as in the proof of Theorem 4.
If the algorithm is ¯nished then we are done. Otherwise, suppose in
contradiction to the theorem that ¼
t+1
j = V (N)¡V (N nj)¡1. This implies
that in iteration t, bidder j is in N
+
t (otherwise j could not belong to Kt). By
assumption, j is a member of every minimally undersupplied set at iteration t,
so N
+
t nfjg is not undersupplied (otherwise Nnfjg would contain a minimally
undersupplied set). Since Z(N
+
t n fjg) = 0 (in (RP Kt)), there exists ¹ 2 ¡¤
t
such that ¹i 2 Dt
i for all i 2 N
+
t n fjg. Furthermore ¹j = ;, otherwise
the algorithm would have ¯nished in iteration t. For any remaining bidder
i 2 N n N
+
t , observe that ¹i 2 Dt
i. (This follows from the observations that
bidder i does not drop out of N
+
t until each pi(S) = vi(S), and that those
prices stop increasing at that point. Hence Di is the powerset of G whenever
i 2 N n N
+
t .)
Since the (iteration t) dual variables are not optimal for (D) we have




























i · V (N n j) + ¼
t
j
= V (N n j) + V (N) ¡ V (N n j) = V (N)
which is a contradiction.
4.1 Incentives
When VCG payments are implemented through the use of a sealed-bid auc-
tion (i.e. a direct revelation mechanism), bidders maximize their payo®s by
bidding truthfully (i.e. truthfully reporting their valuations). In other words,
the VCG mechanism is strategyproof. Therefore it would not be surprising
for an ascending auction (i.e. extensive form game) that implements VCG
22payments to inherit good incentives properties. In fact, the argument is typi-
cally made that if such a (extensive form) game implements VCG payments,
then \truthful behavior" (suitably de¯ned) must be an equilibrium of the
game.
The argument, following the logic of the Revelation Principle, may be
made as follows. Suppose a bidder behaves in a way which is consistent with
some false valuation function (di®erent from his true one). Further suppose
that this causes him to receive objects and make payments corresponding to
the VCG payo® for the false valuation. By strategy-proofness of the VCG
(direct revelation) mechanism, the bidder cannot be better o® than if he had
behaved truthfully.
Unfortunately, this argument does not work if the bidder could behave
in a way which is inconsistent with any valuation function.14 Second, it
does not apply if the bidder behaves consistently with respect to a valuation
function that does not yield a VCG payo® for that valuation. In our setting,
for example, that could happen if the (ASC) condition fails.
The ¯rst of these problems can be ¯xed by specifying the rules of the
auction in a way that bidders must behave consistently with some valuation
function. Secondly, observe that (i) a PD auction must result in an e±cient
outcome (with respect to the inferred valuation functions), and (ii) a bidder
pays at least his VCG payment at the ¯nal, e±cient assignment. Together,
these imply that if a PD auction would result in VCG payo®s under \truthful"
bidding, then such bidding is an equilibrium.
Theorem 6 Suppose the rules of a PD auction are speci¯ed so that any
feasible bidding behavior in the auction is equivalent to truthful demand rev-
elation for some valuation function.15 If the bidders' valuation functions
are such that VCG payo®s would result under truthful bidding (e.g. under
the submodularity condition of Theorem 4), then truthful bidding is a Nash
Equilibrium.
Proof Suppose other bidders with valuations v¡j are bidding truthfully.
When bidder j bids truthfully with respect to vj, he obtains his VCG payo®;
denote the resulting assignment as ¹. When he bids as if his valuation
14Similar di±culties appear in the literature on extensive-form implementation. See
Moore and Repullo (1988).




j, and (ii) if S ½ S0 and S 2 Dt
j then S0 2 Dt
j.
23function is v0
j, denote the resulting assignment as ¹0 and his resulting payment
(for ¹0
j) as p0
j. Finally, let ¹00 2 argmax
P
i6=j vi(¢) be an assignment achieving
value V (N n j).
By the nature of the dual variable ¼j, a PD auction yields a payo® no




















By bidding truthfully, bidder j (with valuation vj) receives his VCG pay-
o®, which is



































The ¯rst inequality follows from the e±ciency of ¹, while the last follows
from (1). Hence bidding truthfully is (weakly) best.
4.2 Necessity of Submodularity
Theorem 4 shows that if a submodularity condition is satis¯ed, then there
exists an ascending auction that implements VCG payments. Here we show
that such a condition is somewhat necessary for the existence of such an
auction, in the following sense.
If the submodularity condition of Theorem 4 fails, then at least one bid-
der's valuation function (say Bidder 1) does not satisfy the following gross
substitutes condition of Kelso and Crawford (1982).16
De¯nition 6 The valuation function vj satis¯es gross substitutes if, for













j(g) 8j 2 N; S µ G
16See Theorem 11 of Ausubel and Milgrom (2002).
24Bundle
Bidder a b ab
1 4 6 16
2 2 10 12
3 8 + ® 2 + ® 8 + ®
Table 3: An example violating gross substitutability.
(i.e. are \additive") and for all S 2 Dj(p), there exists S0 2 Dj(p0) such that
fg 2 S : pj(g) = p0
j(g)g µ S0.
For the 2-object case, the failure of this condition by v1(¢) simply means
v1(ab) > v1(a) + v1(b). In this 2-object case, we show that there exists a
domain of valuation functions for the other bidders (2 through n) on which
no ascending auction (de¯ned below) can always implement VCG payments.
In fact, this result is true even if we require the other bidders' valuation
functions to satisfy the gross substitutes condition.
Gul and Stacchetti (2000) prove a result of this type when auction mech-
anisms are required to assign prices which are \additive" and \anonymous"
(as de¯ned in Section 4.3). Even when all bidders' valuation functions are re-
quired to satisfy gross substitutes, they show that no such ascending auction
can always yield VCG payments. Theorem 4 shows how their impossibil-
ity result can be overcome by allowing a richer set of prices. The result in
this section shows the degree to which our positive result depends on substi-
tutability.
The intuition behind the more general result below can be given with a
simple example. For two objects G = fa;bg, suppose that three bidders have
the valuations given in Table 3. Restricting attention to the cases where
® 2 f¡1;0;1g, it is e±cient to give b to Bidder 2, and a to Bidder 3. Their
respective VCG payments are 8¡® and 6 (while Bidder 1 pays and receives
nothing). Observe that the submodularity condition of Theorem 4 fails in
this example. For the case of three bidders, this is equivalent to the failure
of (ASC) (which happens with respect to M = f2;3g).
If an ascending auction uses only \real price information" to determine
assignments and payments (as we de¯ne below), then it must do two things.
First, it must conclude by o®ering good a to Bidder 3 at a price of 6. Second,
it must determine the value of ® in order to o®er good b to Bidder 2 at the
25correct price of 8¡®. However, for the class of Bidder 3's valuation functions
obtained by varying ® 2 f¡1;0;1g, the value of ® cannot be inferred from
his demand correspondence until Bidder 3 \demands" the empty set, which
occurs only when his price for a exceeds 8+® > 6. This contradicts the fact
that his price for that object ascends throughout the auction and ends at 6.
This idea can be extended to any situation where one bidder has a val-
uation function over two objects that does not satisfy gross substitutes. To
formalize this, we de¯ne an ascending auction by generalizing Gul and Stac-
chetti's de¯nition to allow for non-additive, non-anonymous prices. However,
we strengthen the de¯nition by requiring (with condition (3) below) that
prices seen during the auction must represent actual payments which could
be made by the bidders.
De¯nition 7 A price path is a function P : [0;1] ! R2G£N. For each bundle
of goods H µ G, interpret Pi;H(t) to be the price seen by bidder i for bun-
dle H, at \time" t. A price path is ascending if for all H µ G the function
Pi;H(t) is non-decreasing in t.
An ascending auction adjusts prices based only on the reported demands
of the bidders. The following de¯nition captures that idea.
De¯nition 8 An ascending auction assigns to each pro¯le of bidder valu-
ation functions v 2 R
2G£N
+ both an ascending price path P v and a ¯nal
assignment ¹v satisfying the following two conditions. First, for all valuation
pro¯les v;v0 2 R
2G£N
+ ,











where Dj(P;v) is j's demand correspondence under prices P when his valu-
ations are vj. That is, if a change to valuation functions v0 does not change
the reported demands of bidders, then it does not change the resulting price
path. Information is revealed only through demand revelation in the auc-




v(1);v) 8v 2 R
2G£N
+ (3)
17Naturally, the empty set may be demanded, so information may be revealed when
prices get \too high" for a bidder.
26An ascending auction assigns goods such that each bidder j receives a
bundle H that is in his demand correspondence at prices P(1), and charges
that bidder Pj;H(1). In this sense, we require prices in an auction not to be
merely arti¯cial constructs.
Unfortunately, when at least one bidder has a valuation function that
does not satisfy the gross substitutes condition, an ascending auction cannot
always implement VCG outcomes on some class of problems, as the next
result shows.
Theorem 7 Suppose that there are two objects G = fa;bg and that jNj ¸ 3.
Suppose one bidder's valuation function, say v1, fails the gross substitutes
condition. Then there exists a class of gross substitutes valuation functions
for the other bidders, (Vj)j>1, such that no ascending auction yields VCG
payments for each pro¯le from fv1g £ V2 £ ¢¢¢ £ Vn.
Proof To prove the result, suppose without loss of generality that Bid-
der 1's valuation function fails GS, and that v1(a) ´ x · v1(b) ´ y. Then
v1(ab) = x + y + z where z > 0 (failing GS).
Let Bidder 2 have ¯xed valuations such that v2(a) = 0 and v2(b) =
v2(ab) = y + z, so V2 is a singleton.18 For ® 2 (0;z], consider Bidder 3's
valuations to be of the form v3(a) = v3(b) = v3(ab) = x + ®; this de¯nes the
class V3. Ignore additional bidders (or assign them in¯nitesimal valuations).
Since ® 2 (0;z] and x · y, the e±cient assignment gives good b to
Bidder 2 and gives good a to Bidder 3. The VCG payment of Bidder 2 is
y+z ¡®, while that of Bidder 3 is x (and Bidder 1 obviously pays nothing).
To yield VCG payments, the price path must ¯nish at t = 1 by yielding
P3;a(1) = x for any ® 2 (0;z]. Since P3;a(¢) · x throughout the auction
(by monotonicity), Bidder 3 never demands the empty set. Therefore, his
demand correspondence, argmaxS v3(S) ¡ P3;S, is independent of ® 2 (0;z].
By the requirement (2) of an ascending auction, this means that the
price paths on the domain fv1g£fv2g£V3 must be independent of ®. This
contradicts the fact that it should always yield Bidder 2's VCG payment,
which does vary with ®.
This result may appear to contradict the results of Ausubel (2000) and
Parkes and Ungar (2002), who provide auction algorithms which always yield
VCG payments. This apparent contradiction is resolved by observing that
18A similar proof exists with strictly monotonic valuation functions.
27the algorithms provided by those authors do not satisfy our de¯nition of an
ascending auction.
For example, with restrictions on the class of valuation functions, Ausubel
(2000) makes clever use of the observation that any increase in prices results
in a corresponding decrease in payo®s for the bidders. Speci¯cally, suppose
that an auctioneer could determine not only \market clearing" (Walrasian)
prices for the set of bidders N, but also determine such (hypothetical) prices
if the set of bidders were N n j. Since bidder j's VCG payment equals
the e®ect of his presence on the other bidders, this amount can be inferred
by examining the di®erence between these two price vectors. Hence, VCG
payments for all bidders could be calculated by determining n+1 Walrasian
price vectors, i.e. by running n + 1 Walrasian auctions.19
Such an algorithm does not, as stated, satisfy De¯nition 8. Our de¯nition
allows for only a single set of (bundle) prices. While other price structures
(such as Ausubel's) can be mapped into prices of this form, the resulting
prices may no longer be ascending. In this instance, since bidder j's ¯nal
payment in Ausubel's auction is determined by the di®erence between two
ascending vectors of parameters|the Walrasian prices and the hypothetical
prices without bidder j|his surplus could actually increase during the auc-
tion. In this sense, the auction cannot be described in terms of ascending
bundle prices.
4.3 Insu±ciency of Anonymous Prices
The prices presented to bidders in the PD auction are non-anonymous, mean-
ing that di®erent bidders may see di®erent prices for the same bundle; for-
mally, prices are anonymous if pj(S) = pi(S) for all i;j 2 N and all S µ G.
Furthermore, the prices are non-additive, meaning that the price of a bundle
is not necessary the sum of the prices of the objects in that bundle; formally,
prices are additive if pi(S) =
P
g2S pi(g) for all i 2 N and all S µ G. One
may wonder whether, in some environments, such rich (non-anonymous and
non-additive) prices are overly complex in achieving VCG payments.
For instance, one of the simplest special cases of our model is the as-
signment problem, in which bidders' valuation functions are of the form
19A similar reasoning combined with Theorem 5 shows that the bidders' VCG payments
could be obtained for any type of valuation functions by running n (or fewer) iterations
of PD auctions, the jth iteration omitting j from the chosen undersupplied sets whenever
possible.
28vj(S) = maxg2S vj(g) for all S µ G. For this class of problems, Demange
et al. (1986) describe an auction that uses anonymous, additive prices, and
yields VCG payments. On the other hand, Gul and Stacchetti (2000) show
that even if bidders' valuation functions satisfy the gross substitutes condi-
tion in the current model, there exists no ascending VCG auction that uses
anonymous, additive prices.
The anonymity of prices can only be achieved in settings in which the
VCG outcome is envy-free, i.e. where each bidder j would rather make his
own VCG payment in exchange for his prescribed bundle than to make any
other bidder i's VCG payment in exchange for i's prescribed bundle. It is
commonly observed that in many environments, the VCG outcome is not
envy-free, hence anonymous prices are not \rich" enough in those environ-
ments.20
We leave it as an open question as to whether (or under what assump-
tions) non-anonymous but additive prices could be used in an ascending
auction to implement VCG payments.21
5 Subgradient Algorithms
By writing the e±cient-allocation problem as a linear program (P), we ob-
tain the de¯nition of PD auctions as a by-product of one particular method
of solving that linear program: the primal-dual algorithm. It is therefore
natural to wonder whether other methods of solving linear programs may
yield auctions, and how they may resemble PD auctions.
In this section, we argue that an application of another such method|
subgradient algorithms|yields the type of auction algorithm described by
Parkes (1999), Parkes and Ungar (2002), and Ausubel and Milgrom (2002).
20One clear exception is the previously mentioned assignment problem. P¶ apai (2003)
shows that the VCG outcome is envy-free when all bidders have superadditive valuation
functions.
21Under a liberal interpretation of this question, one could say that Ausubel (2000)
answers this question a±rmatively. As discussed above, our interpretation of auction
prices (De¯nition 8) does not admit such an auction format.
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The µi multipliers are Lagrange multipliers. By the duality theorem of lin-
ear programming, Z = minµ¸0 Z(µ). Finding µ¤ 2 argminµ¸0 Z(µ) can be
accomplished using the subgradient algorithm.
At iteration t, the current value of the Lagrange multiplier µt is adjusted
by choosing a subgradient of Z(µt), st, and setting µt+1 = µt + ¢tst, where
¢t is a positive \step size." In fact, if xt is an optimal solution at iteration t








j > bi, then µ
t+1
i > µt
i, increasing the \penalty term" on this
violated constraint. Similarly, if
P
j aijxt
j < bi, then µi is decreased.
If step sizes are chosen appropriately, this procedure converges to an
optimal solution. However, convergence of the subgradient algorithm can be
very slow (Fisher, 1981).
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0 · yj(S) 8S µ G; 8j 2 N
0 · ±¹ 8¹ 2 ¡
(P')
by relaxing the coupling constraints yj(S) ·
P
¹:¹j=S ±¹. Let µj(S) ¸ 0 be
the corresponding multipliers. We interpret µj(S) as the price of bundle S
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it becomes easy to see that for a given µ, the solution to this problem can be
found as follows.
1. Choose ¹ to maximize
P
j2N µj(¹j) and set ±¹ = 1. In other words,
choose the assignment of objects that maximizes the seller's revenue at
current prices; denote it ¹t.
312. For each j 2 N choose Sj to maximize vj(S) ¡ µj(S) and set yj(Sj) =
1. In other words, choose for each bidder a single, payo®-maximizing
bundle at current prices.
If Sj is assigned to bidder j under ¹t, then the corresponding constraint
yj(Sj) ·
P
¹:¹j=S ±¹ is satis¯ed with equality. In this case, equation (4)
tells us there is no change in µj(Sj). In other words, if a bidder's utility
maximizing bundle is in the selected seller-revenue maximizing assignment
¹t, then there is no price change on this bundle.
If Sj is not assigned to bidder j under ¹t, then the constraint yj(Sj) · P
¹:¹j=S ±¹ is violated. Furthermore, equation (4) increases the value of µj(Sj)
by ¢t > 0, i.e. if this utility-maximizing bundle is not in ¹t, then it sees a





0 < 1. In this case µj(S) is decreased by ¢t, i.e. a non-demanded bundle that
is a part of ¹t sees a price decrease.
Due to the last observation, this algorithm as described does not yield an
auction with ascending prices. A modi¯cation of this algorithm that carefully
handles ties and omits such price decreases can be made to yield ascending
prices and result in an e±cient assignment. Such modi¯cations appear in
the auctions of Kelso and Crawford (1982), Parkes and Ungar (2002), and
Ausubel and Milgrom (2002).
6 Conclusion
We have demonstrated that an ascending auction for heterogeneous objects
can be constructed through re-interpretation of a primal-dual algorithm.
Writing the e±cient-assignment problem as a suitable linear program yields
dual variables which can be interpreted as bundle prices and, in some cases,
as bidders' Vickrey-Clarke-Groves payments (in the spirit of Bikhchandani
and Ostroy, 2002). A primal-dual algorithm adjusts dual variables in order to
satisfy complementary slackness; we interpret our application of this method
as an adjustment of prices to satisfy bidder demand.
Therefore, in some cases, VCG payments can be implemented through
such an ascending procedure|a Primal-Dual Auction. We argue that in
other cases, no ascending auction can do so (Theorem 7).
The central concept used in the PD auction to adjust prices is that of
minimally undersupplied sets of bidders. It can be considered a generaliza-
32tion of a concept used by Demange et al. (1986) in the special case of the
assignment problem (allocating at most one object per bidder). Demange
et al. call a set of objects H µ G \overdemanded" when H contains fewer
objects than the number of bidders who demand only those objects, i.e.
jfj 2 N : S µ H for all S 2 Djgj > jHj:
In each round of their auction, each bidder sees a price increase for each
object in some minimally overdemanded set of objects.
Observe that if H is minimally overdemanded in their sense, then fj 2
N : S µ H for all S 2 Djg is undersupplied and must contain a minimally
undersupplied set of bidders. A PD auction would increase the price of
each object in that set, but in a non-anonymous way: a bidder's price for
an object increases only if he currently demands it. This non-anonymity is
required in the more general setting since, in general, VCG payments cannot
be supported by anonymous prices. For this reason, PD auctions (and the
notion of undersupplied bidders) generalize the auction of Demange et al.
(1986).
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